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Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of a dramatic reform of the Dutch pension system on 
mental health, savings behavior and retirement expectations of workers nearing 
retirement age. The reform means that public sector workers born on January 1, 1950 or 
later face a substantial reduction in their pension rights while workers born before this 
threshold date may still retire under the old, more generous rules. We employ a unique 
matched survey and administrative data set comprising male public sector workers born 
in 1949 and 1950 and find strong ex ante effects on mental health for workers who are 
affected by the reform. This effect increases as birth dates approach the threshold date.  
Furthermore, the effects differ in accordance with worker characteristics. Finally, we find 
that the response of those affected by the reform is to work longer and to save more. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper assesses the mental health effects of a change in the Dutch pension system. 
Prior to 2006, public sector workers in the Netherlands could retire at age 62 years and 3 
months with a replacement rate of 70% of their average yearly earnings since 2002.1 As 
of 2006, those born before January 1, 1950 could continue to retire under the old rules, 
but for those born on or after January 1, 1950 the replacement rate is lowered to 64%. 
These younger workers need to work an additional 1 year and 1 month to obtain the 70% 
replacement rate enjoyed by counterparts who may be just a few days, weeks or months 
older. Two years after the policy change, we compared the mental health of workers born 
in 1949 (turning 59 years old in 2008) and 1950 (turning 58 years old in 2008). We find 
strong effects from the exogenous change in the retirement system: depression rates 
among the 1950 cohort were about 40% higher than among the 1949 cohort. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study to document large and persistent ex ante mental health 
effects from a change in a retirement system. 
Our findings are relevant for a number of reasons. First, depression is a relatively 
common disorder, with prevalence rates of about 10% in the US, the UK and The 
Netherlands. Depression is among the leading causes of disability worldwide (WHO, 
2006) and it is associated with heart disease, diabetes, some forms of cancer, and other 
diseases. Indeed, health care expenditures of depressed individuals are about four times 
higher than those of non-depressed individuals. In addition to these direct effects on 
health care costs, indirect costs from depression are substantial. Depression leads to lower 
productivity, workplace errors, faulty products, accidents, and increased absenteeism and 
disability insurance expenditures. In fact, in the last decade an increasing share of 
disability insurance expenditure in the western world is due to mental illnesses (OECD, 
2008). 
Second, our findings are relevant for public policy in the context of ageing. Most 
developed countries are currently encouraging prolonged working lives for older workers 
in order to mitigate the adverse effects of an aging population. Increasing labor force 
                                                 
1 Until January 1, 2002, pension benefits were calculated using wage earnings in the year prior to retirement. 
Since 2002, pension benefits have been calculated using average annual earnings since 2002.  
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participation rates among older workers improves the fiscal stability of pension systems. 
However, a natural question which has been largely overlooked by policy makers 
concerns the effect of later retirement on individual well-being and, in particular, on 
health. Adverse (or positive) effects from later retirement on post-retirement health not 
only influence individual well-being, but also directly affect health care costs at ages after 
retirement. Our finding of persistent ex ante health effects from changes in the retirement 
system suggests that post-retirement health worsens when individuals are induced to 
extend their working lives. 
Third, following up on the second point, there is a recent and growing body of 
literature on the health effects of retirement. Cross-sectional analyses usually find that 
those who retire early have worse post-retirement health. Shan et al. (2005) compare 
mortality rates at later ages and find that post-65 mortality rates are higher for those who 
retire early. Dave, et al. (2006) find that earlier retirement is associated with poor 
physical and mental health after retirement. It has been hypothesized that retirement in 
itself is a stressful event, or that retired people lose the physical and mental activity that is 
associated with work and/or that social networks associated with work decline. The 
policy implication of such findings indicates that increasing retirement age would lead to 
better individual health and well-being and may reduce the burden on (public) health care 
systems as well as on pension systems. Alternatively, it may be true that aspects of work 
(stress or job characteristics) worsen health, leading to positive effects from retirement 
and negative effects from continued work. These alternative mechanisms illustrate that it 
is difficult to infer causation from a direct comparison of the health status of early retirees 
with later retirees. Indeed, health may affect work and vice versa. Moreover, unobserved 
factors may confound the relationship between health and work. 
Recent papers in this area have tried to circumvent this endogeneity problem by 
using an Instrumental Variable approach. Charles (2002) and Neumann (2007) use age-
specific retirement incentives provided by the US social security system to capture 
changes in labor force participation that are unrelated to health. Similarly, Bound and 
Waidmann (2008) employ age-specific retirement incentives of the UK social security 
system to gauge the effect of retirement on health. Coe and Lindeboom (2008) use the 
availability of retirement windows as an instrument. All these studies confirm that the 
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cross-sectional association between health and retirement is positive; i.e., those who retire 
later tend to be in better health. However, when the endogeneity of retirement is 
accounted for, the results change dramatically. Coe and Lindeboom (2008) find no 
negative effect from early retirement on male health; if anything, these authors report a 
temporary increase in self-reported health improvement in highly educated workers. 
Bound & Waidmann (2008) find no evidence of negative health effects from retirement 
and some evidence that there may be a positive effect for males. Neumann (2007) finds, 
for subjective health measures, that retirement maintains health, but finds no effect on 
objective health variables.  Charles (2002) focuses on mental health and finds that the 
direct effect of retirement on mental well being is positive. Our findings of strong ex ante 
mental health effects are consistent with the Charles (2002) findings. 
Finally, the finding of ex ante effects of retirement on mental health has 
implications for the literature on the determinants of retirement decision making. The 
larger part of this vast literature focuses on the role of financial incentives on retirement 
behavior, with health included as an exogenous regressor (see e.g., the survey by 
Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). For the identification of the causal effect of financial 
incentives on retirement it is generally believed that it is preferable to rely on exogenous 
changes in the retirement system. In the presence of ex ante health effects, changes in the 
retirement system will not only have an impact on the budget constraint, but will also 
influence health prior to retirement. This will confound both the health effects and the 
effect of financial incentives in retirement models.2 
Our contribution is most closely related to the recent paper by Falba et al. (2008), 
which examines the impact on depression of deviation of actual retirement dates from 
their preceding expectations. The paper finds significant effects on depression at age 62 
from those working more than expected and from those working less than expected.  Our 
study differs from this paper in three important ways. First, we are able to exploit a 
natural experiment that generates a drastic change in the retirement system that is 
independent of health and that affects only a subgroup of workers. We link survey and 
                                                 
2 Part of the effect of the financial incentives will be absorbed by the health effect if health changes prior to 
actual retirement. This suggests, moreover, that there are feedback effects of work on health, which in turn 
implies that health should be treated as an endogenous regressor in retirement models. See Bound and 
Waidmann (2008) for similar reasoning in the context of the effects of retirement on post-retirement health. 
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administrative information of the pension fund. The survey was conducted in 2008 and 
consists of approximately 5,200 observations of fulltime working males born in 1949 and 
1950. All individuals were informed about the policy change implemented in 2006. The 
limited age difference between the treatment and control groups in our sample and the 
simple and transparent age criterion determining entitlement to the old or new pension 
rights guarantees the internal validity of the experiment. Our findings are therefore less 
likely to be confounded. Second, our study shows that there are ex ante effects, that these 
are substantial and that they persist over time. Third, our data allow, to some extent, for 
further analysis of savings decisions and retirement expectations. This gives more insight 
into the mechanisms underlying our findings. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief description of the 
institutional setting in The Netherlands and the policy change that was implemented in 
January 2006. Section 3 describes the data and examines the validity of our natural 
experiment, i.e., whether individuals are aware of the reform and whether the treated 
group and the control group are comparable with respect to other characteristics. Section 
4 presents the results of the empirical analyses.  We analyze, in Section 5, whether the 
reform changes retirement savings and retirement expectations of the affected group. In 
Section 6, we further explore mechanisms that may explain our finding of higher 
depression rates among workers affected by the reform. We close with a discussion of our 
conclusions. 
 
 
2 The Dutch pension system 
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars: 1) at age 65, all residents are entitled 
to a state old age pension financed by contributions that are levied along with the income 
tax; 2) most employees are entitled to an (early) supplementary sectoral or firm pension 
of the defined-benefit type; and 3) individuals can voluntarily build up savings typically 
taken as annuities through an insurance company. However, due to the supplementary 
pensions in the second pillar, the third pillar is less well developed in The Netherlands. 
For nearly all employees, early retirement before the age of 65 is possible only through 
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the sectoral pension systems in the second pillar. In general for individual employees, 
participation in sectoral pension schemes is mandatory. These pension schemes are 
negotiated between unions and employer organizations at the sector or firm level and are 
officially set forth in collective agreements. The administration of these schemes is 
delegated to pension funds to which both employers and employees contribute. The 
‘Algemeen Burgelijk Pensioenfonds’ (ABP) is the pension fund for public sector workers 
in The Netherlands. Until 2006, sectoral pension schemes were facilitated by the 
government through preferential tax treatment which granted large tax advantages due to 
the progressive tax system (Euwals et al., 2006).3 
 
Changes in the pension system for workers in the public sector 
The 2006 reform of the Dutch pension system provides the basis for our natural 
experiment. In line with its policy of stimulating the labor force participation of older 
workers, the government abolished the favorable tax treatment of early retirement 
schemes for all workers born after 1949.4 As in other sectors, anticipation of the change 
in tax rules formed an input to collective bargaining on the introduction of a new pension 
scheme for the public sector in the summer of 2005 (‘ABP flexible pension scheme’). In 
light of demographic changes, it had by then been acknowledged that reform of the 
pension system would be a necessity. In that sense, a change in pension rights was not 
entirely unexpected. However, the timing of the reform as well as the particular 
implementation of a discontinuous assignment rule and the strong differential treatment 
of workers born around January 1, 1950 came as a surprise to public sector employees 
when it was announced on July 5, 2005. 
The new pension scheme for public sector workers was launched on January 1, 
2006. Workers born before 1950 remain entitled to the old, generous pre-pension rights if 
they have worked continuously in the public sector since April 1, 1997. This means that 
such workers can retire between age 55 and 65. Retirement at age 62 years and 3 months 
yields a pension benefit at a replacement rate of 70% of average yearly earnings since 
                                                 
3 Employees and employers were allowed to deduct their contribution to the sectoral early retirement 
schemes from their current income.  
4 The abolition of favorable tax treatment was not limited to the public sector but also applied to workers in 
the private sector. 
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2002. However, employees born after 1949 and workers born before 1950 who did not 
work continuously in the public sector in the 10 years prior to retirement are subject to 
the new and less generous system. The new flexible pension system is characterized by: 
(i) a drop in pension benefits, (ii) an increase in pension contribution payments to partly 
account for the drop in pension wealth resulting from (i), and (iii) stronger incentives to 
continue working, generated by penalties on pension income when retiring before 
commencement of the state pension at age 65 and by supplements for later retirement. 
Moreover, the eligibility age for pension benefits is increased to 60 years and workers 
may decide to continue working until their 70th birthday. For younger workers, the 
increase in pension contributions partly compensates for the decrease in pension benefits 
over time. However, public sector workers born just after 1949 do not have enough time 
to compensate for this drop in pension benefits. Therefore, as a consequence of both the 
abolition of the tax rules and the steeper early retirement scheme, workers born after 31 
December 1949 are confronted with a substantial decrease in pension benefits if they 
wish to retire at age 62 and 3 months. More specifically, the replacement rate drops to 
64% and they must work an additional 13 months to qualify for a pension at a 
replacement rate of 70%.5 
In 2006, the Dutch government also introduced the “Life course savings” program 
(Levensloopregeling). This program allows tax free saving of up to 12% of annual 
earnings in a fund that can be used to finance periods of non-employment, such as a 
sabbatical or early retirement. Workers are allowed to save up to a cumulative amount of 
210% of their annual earnings in this “life course savings” fund, which can be used to 
finance about two years of early retirement. Note, however, that at a savings rate of 12%, 
a worker needs to save for 17.5 years to reach the cumulative maximum of 210%. Special 
arrangements were made for older workers who were most affected by the pension 
reform. Those who were born in the years 1950 through 1954 are allowed to save more 
than 12% of their annual earnings, so long as the cumulative maximum does not exceed 
210% of annual earnings. It must be noted that workers of the 1950 cohort have to save 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, there is a small minority of older employees born after 1950 who can still retire early 
without experiencing a substantial drop in income. This pertains to employees with burdensome jobs 
(firemen, ambulance and police personnel) who are eligible for special arrangements that allow early 
retirement against a replacement rate of at least 70% between ages 55 and 61. However, these workers are 
not included in our data. 
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for seven years approximately 14% of their annual earnings to finance early retirement at 
age 62. It is likely that only a very small fraction of such workers are willing or capable 
of saving such a high proportion of their earnings each year before retirement. 
The strong differential treatment of workers born around January 1, 1950 came as 
a surprise to public sector employees. However, for our empirical analyses it is important 
that workers born in 1950 are aware of the consequences of the new pension system for 
their individual situations. To make the introduction of the new pension system known to 
participants, ABP launched a campaign in the second half of 2005 to explain the 
implications of the new system. A special newspaper was devoted to the new pension 
system; in it, unions, employer organizations and ABP jointly explained the new flexible 
pension scheme. All 1.2 million ABP participants received a letter on the core 
characteristics of the new scheme and a complete electronic service pack for public 
service employers was developed. Therefore, we may assume that at 1 January 2006 most 
public sector employees born after 1949 and their employers were familiar with the 
exogenous shock in their pension rights. Of course this must be verified empirically. 
Since our data contain information on the replacement rate at age 62, we can check 
whether those born after 1949 indeed predict their replacement rate to be lower than 70%. 
We return to this issue at the end of the next section. 
 
 
3 Data 
Matched survey and administrative data 
We use matched survey data and administrative data for male full time employees in the 
public sector who were born in 1949 or 1950.6 The administrative data come from the 
pension fund for public sector employees in The Netherlands (ABP). The data contain 
detailed information on annual wage income, the number of years of contribution and 
establishment size. 
                                                 
6 We focus on male employees because the male worker aged 57 or 58 is generally the main family wage 
earner. Moreover, in The Netherlands only a small group of women of this birth cohort is still working. 
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The panel survey data are available for two years. The data in the initial wave 
were gathered in two stages, one year after the introduction of the new pension system. In 
the first stage, all 27,871 male public sector workers in the Netherlands who were born in 
1949 or 1950 were sent a request to participate in the survey and to provide their e-mail 
address.7 In the second stage, those who gave permission (11,458 workers sent their e-
mail address) received an e-mail with a link to the survey. In total, 8,526 individuals 
answered the questionnaire, of which 7,739 completed it successfully. Analyses based on 
the administrative data show that the 7,739 respondents form a representative sample of 
the 27,871 male public sector workers in the Netherlands born in 1949 or 1950. 
In this study, we rely on data from the second wave of the survey, which was held 
in March 2008 and includes 6,078 employees of the public sector.8 In this wave, detailed 
questions were asked on mental and physical health, retirement expectations and job 
characteristics. The analysis is restricted to full time employees who have worked 
continuously in the public sector since 1997. 9  For these workers, the pension reform is 
clear and simple, as age is the only criterion that determines whether a worker is eligible 
for the restricted or the more generous retirement scheme. The final sample consists of 
5,195 men, of which 2,724 were born in 1950 (the treatment group) and 2,471 were born 
in 1949 (the control group). 
Our primary interest lies in investigating how the change in the pension system 
affects the mental health of public sector workers. For measuring mental health, we use 
the CES-D8 indicator of depression, derived from the Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression Scale (CES-D, Radloff 1977). The CES-D8 is a well validated instrument for 
measuring emotional function and depressive symptoms (see Blazer et al., 1991; Hays et 
al., 1993; Adams et al., 2003; Falba et al. 2008) and is used in many large sample-
population based studies such as the US Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).  The CES-
D8 consists of eight items, of which six are negatively phrased statements that reflect the 
presence of depressive symptoms (depression; that everything was an effort; restless 
                                                 
7 This most likely does not affect the representativeness of the survey. At least 91% of the public workers 
aged 55 years or older have an internet connection at home (TNS-NIPO, 2006). Moreover, virtually all 
public sector workers have internet access at work. 
8 For the second wave, all individuals who started the questionnaire in 2007 received an e-mail with the 
link to the survey in March 2008.  
9 We therefore excluded 260 observations on employees born in 1949 who are not eligible for the old 
pension rights. This group is not large enough to serve as an additional control group.  
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sleep; inability to get going; felt lonely; and felt sad). Two positively phrased statements 
reflect the absence of depressive symptoms (enjoying life and happiness). To create the 
variable used in our analyses, we first dichotomize (yes/no) responses and reverse the 
coding of the positively phrased items to achieve a count variable from 0 to 8, where 
higher values suggest worsening depressive symptoms. In the next step, we construct a 
dummy variable that indicates whether workers are considered to be depressed. We used 
the suggested score of 4 and above, consistent with probable clinical depression (see 
Andresen et al., 1994; and Blazer et al., 1991). 
In addition to mental health, we collected information about physical health, using 
both objective and subjective measures. First, we asked public sector workers the 
following question: In general, how would you describe your current health? Response 
categories ranged form 1 (very good) to 5 (bad). Second, we asked individuals to describe 
their health in comparison with other persons of the same age and in comparison with 
their health situation three years ago.  Again, response categories ranged form 1 (very 
good) to 5 (bad). Thirdly, we asked how often individuals visited their doctor in 2007 and 
whether they were sick for more than 14 days. Lastly, we asked workers whether their 
health limits them in the kind and amount of work they are able to perform. 
 
Descriptives 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample, the treatment group and the 
control group. The last column gives the results of a simple t-test for equality of the 
means of a variable for both groups. The table shows that on average 4.3% of all public 
sector workers are depressed as measured by our depression indicator. Workers with 
retrenched pension rights are relatively more depressed (5.0%) than those who are not 
affected by the policy change (3.5%). A simple t-test indicates that the difference 
between the two groups is significant at the 5% level (t-stat = 2.63). A similar result is 
found for the raw CES-D8 score (t-stat = 2.03). This preliminary analysis indicates that 
there is a negative ex ante effect from the shock in the pension system on the mental 
health of workers nearing retirement. The table also shows that there are no significant 
differences in the averages of the physical health measures between the two groups. In 
2007, on average, workers visited their doctor twice, 17% of workers were sick more than 
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14 days and 18% indicated that their health limits them in their job. The t-statistics for the 
differences between the controls and the treated for number of doctor visits, self-reported 
health and the limitations question are 0.05, 0.83 and 0.28, respectively. 
For the validity of the natural experiment, it is important that the individuals in the 
treatment and control groups be sufficiently similar (apart from differential treatment in 
the pension system). Table 1 shows that most differences between the group of workers 
who are affected by the new pension system and the group that falls under the old system 
are indeed extremely small. Job characteristics, personal characteristics and wealth 
components are similar across both groups, and with a few exceptions, are not 
significantly different from each other. Concerning job characteristics, we observe that 
most public sector workers have mentally demanding work (67%) and that they spend 
approximately 29% of their working time on non-routine tasks.10 Approximately 62% of 
public sector workers have a high education level and more than 91% are married.11 The 
fraction of married individuals is slightly higher among the group that is not affected by 
reform and this difference is significant at the 10% level. It will therefore be important to 
control for marital status in the multivariate analyses. We also see some very small yet 
significant differences between the two groups in work sector.  The most recurrent wealth 
components are private savings (more than 15,000 Euros), net housing wealth and 
annuity insurance. Among the set of wealth variables, three variables are significantly 
different between the control and the treatment groups: the number of years individuals 
built up pension rights in the public sector pension fund; the response to a question on 
whether respondents undertook extra savings arrangements for their retirement in the past 
year; and the response to a question on whether individuals participated in the “Life 
course savings” program (see Section 2). The difference in the pension rights variable (t-
stat = 8.2) is due to the small age difference between the control and the treatment groups. 
The extra pension savings (t-stat = 3.7) and participation in the “Life course savings” 
program (t-stat = 9.3) are likely to be responses to the policy reform. In light of this, it is 
                                                 
10 The questions on physically/mentally demanding work are based on two survey questions which asked 
how well they identified themselves with the following statements: I have physically (mentally) demanding 
work. Answer categories ranged form 1 (very good) to 5 (bad). For this table, the answer categories are 
dichotomized (1 corresponds to a score of 1 or 2, and 0 corresponds to a score of 3 or higher).   
11 The public sector has an overrepresentation of highly educated workers. The fraction in our sample is 
consistent with the OSA labor supply panel, which is a representative panel survey of the working 
population in The Netherlands.   
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noted that the government introduced favorable tax treatment for participation in the 
“Life course savings” program and in particular for those affected by the reform (see 
Section 2). Of the 1949 cohort, only 6% participate in this “Life course savings” program. 
Of the 1950 cohort, this fraction is more than two times higher (about 15%). In Section 5, 
we further explore individual savings behavior in response to the reform. 
Respondents were asked three questions concerning their retirement expectations: 
1) At what age did you expect to retire 5 years ago? 2) At what age do you expect to 
retire now? 3) Suppose, you would retire at the age of 62. How large would your pension 
benefit be as a percentage of your net wage income? The average response to the first 
question does not differ significantly between the treated and the control groups. 
However, we do find a significant difference between the two groups for the second 
question (t-stat = 3.1), although this difference is relatively small. Those born in 1949 on 
average expect to retire at age 61 years and 8 months, while those born in 1950 expect to 
retire at age 62 years and 1 month. This small difference in expected retirement age could 
imply that many workers in the treatment group accept lower pension benefits because 
they do not want to change their retirement plans. Another possible explanation is that 
workers are not well enough informed about their pension rights or that they increased 
their private savings. In light of the latter variable, it is important to have a closer look at 
the response to the third question. 
 
Do people understand the consequences of the changes in the pension system? 
The averages in Table 1 show that respondents born in 1949 expect, on average, a 
pension income at the replacement rate of 72% at retirement age 62, while employees 
born in 1950 anticipate a replacement rate of only 67% at this age (t-stat = 16.0). These 
expectations are remarkably close to the actual replacement rates of 70% and 64%, 
respectively, that they are forecast to receive based on past and projected pension 
contributions. Figure 1 shows expected replacement rates for workers born in 1949 and 
1950. The dots represent expected average replacement rates for individuals born in a 
specific month. The first month corresponds to January 1949; the last month (number 24) 
corresponds to December 1950. The figure shows that there is a clear break in 
expectations around the threshold date (December 31, 1949). It seems reasonable to 
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conclude from the figure that employees are indeed familiar with the consequences of the 
new pension system with respect to their individual situations. 
 
 
4 Results 
We operate simple linear probability models for whether an individual is depressed. The 
results are presented in Table 2. An individual is defined to be depressed if the CES-D8 
score equals 4 or higher (see section 3). The table includes a base specification, where, 
apart from the indicator for the reform, no other variables are included. The remaining 
columns refer to specifications where, subsequently, additional controls are included. In 
specification II, we add a set of individual controls, including age, marital status, 
education, wage income, how many years the worker has contributed to the pension fund 
and job characteristics (sector of work). This specification excludes an indicator for 
whether individuals characterize their work as mentally or physically demanding, and the 
proportion of routine tasks. It is conceivable that depression status may have a direct 
effect on these variables. In specification III, we add a set of controls for personal wealth. 
Although our data set contains indicators for wealth aside from those included here, such 
as whether individuals have an annuity or a life insurance policy, whether they have more 
than 15,000 Euros in their bank account, and whether they participate in a life course 
savings program (see Table 1), we decide not to include these variables in the regressions 
because some of these variables may themselves be influenced by the reform and may 
therefore absorb some of the effect of the reform on depression. 
For wealth variables that we do include, it is less likely that they are affected by 
the pension reform. However, there were some missing observations: the sample size is 
reduced to 3,314 observations if we omit those observations where at least one of the 
wealth variables is missing. We therefore include indicators for whether there was item 
non-response on each of the included wealth variables.12 In the last specification (IV) we 
include the three potentially endogenous job characteristics variables (whether the work 
                                                 
12 We also run a regression where we include only these 3,314 observations. The coefficient of the reform 
was even higher (0.032 with standard error of 0.013) and was significant at the 1 percent level.  
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was mentally or physically demanding and the fraction of routine tasks) along with other 
health indicators and a health care utilization variable. One could argue that these health 
variables are potentially endogenous in the sense that they may relate to unobservable 
factors that also influence depression, or that causality may run from depression status to 
the health variable. Note however, that we find no differences between both groups for 
these health and job characteristics variables (see Table 1 and the discussion in the data 
section). Inclusion of these variables controls for individual heterogeneity and it is 
therefore expected that such inclusion will have little impact on the estimate of the reform 
indicator. A comparison of the reform dummy in specifications III and IV will be 
informative on this issue. 
The results displayed in the table are very clear: in all specifications the reform 
has significant effects on mental health and the magnitude of these effects increases when 
we add controls for individual heterogeneity. These effects are sizeable. For instance, the 
coefficient in the last specification (specification IV) is 0.028, which implies an 
additional effect of 2.8 percentage points on top of the average depression rate (on the 
order of 3.5% – 5.0%). The other variables in Table 2 show the expected signs. For 
example those who are married have a lower probability of being depressed; the same 
holds for those whose partner has a pension or an income. The health variables are all 
strongly significant, although these effects may be biased as discussed above. We see 
however, no large changes in the reform indicator across the different specifications in 
columns II, III and IV. Next, we perform analyses on the total CES-D8 score. This 
variable ranges from 0 to 7 and shows substantive heaping at the 0 score. Following 
Falba et al. (2008), we estimate a Poisson model;13 the results are reported in Table A1 of 
the appendix and they indicate that the reform has a significant impact on CES-D8 score. 
We also perform regressions on subsamples for different age windows around the 
treatment threshold. We include these regressions for two reasons. First, it is conceivable 
that effects from the reform may be particularly strong for individuals who barely missed 
the old generous pension system by a few days, weeks or months. After all, the deadline 
of December 31, 1949 is arbitrary and given that there is an effect from the pension 
reform on the depression rate, one may expect that this effect will be stronger on those 
                                                 
13 A regression of log(CES-D8 +1) gave similar results. 
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who, by fate, just missed the threshold. A second reason is that we include age in the 
specifications of Table 2 as the number of days after January 1, 1949. Clearly age should 
be controlled for as this may be a relevant factor for depression. At the same time, there is 
little variation in the age variable and it clearly correlates with the reform dummy; this 
may affect our results. By omitting the age variable in the regressions, but nevertheless 
estimating the regressions for different age windows, we address the issue of the 
sensitivity of our findings to the inclusion of the linear age variable. 
The results are presented in Table 3. The table reports only the coefficients of the 
reform indicator, but all regressions include the full set of controls, as in specification IV 
of Table 2. Table 3 shows that the effect of the reform is stronger for those born near the 
threshold date and that the effect gradually decreases with a wider window around the 
threshold date. We think that the age range for the smallest window is too small for age 
effects to be relevant. Therefore, the coefficient of 0.024 for the treatment effect can be 
expected to be a reliable estimate of the causal impact of the reform. This coefficient is 
only slightly smaller than the 0.028 that we obtained from specification IV in Table 2, 
where age is included as a linear trend. This adds confidence to the estimates presented in 
Table 2. 
The pattern in the coefficients of Table 3 suggests that those who were born just 
after the threshold date (January – March 1950) are more depressed than those who were 
born later in the year (April – December 1950). The average depression rate for those 
born in the January – March 1950 period is 0.053, compared to 0.048 for their younger 
counterparts born in the April – December 1950 period. However, a simple t-test shows 
that this difference is not significant (t-stat = 1.0). Alternatively, there could be a “relief 
effect,” meaning that particularly those who just qualified (i.e., those born October – 
December 1949) have lower depression rates. We therefore check the depression rates for 
several groups. The average depression rate for those born October – December 1949 is 
0.027, whereas the depression rate for their older counterparts (January – September 
1949) who also qualified for the old generous pension system is 0.036. This suggests a 
relief effect. A t-test, however, revealed that the differences between these two groups is 
also not significant (t-stat = 0.5).  However, the insignificance of these effects could be 
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due to the relatively small number of observations around the threshold date 
(approximately 550 observations for each group on either side of the threshold date). 
 Further, we analyze whether the pension reform differentially affects different 
types of workers. Table 4 presents the results of separate analyses on subsamples. The 
regressions include the same set of explanatory variables as in specification IV of Table 2, 
but again we here report only the coefficient for the reform indicator. The table shows 
that there can be substantial differences in the impacts of the reform for different 
subgroups. The effects are in the expected direction. For instance, those who are not 
married experience a substantially greater effect from the reform, although the effect is 
significant only at the 10% level, which may be due to the low number of unmarried 
males in our sample. The reform has the greatest financial consequences for those with a 
higher income and those with nearly full pension rights (measured by number of years 
contributing to the pension fund). Indeed, the effect of the reform on mental health is also 
highest for these workers. Similarly, workers whose partners have a pension or an income 
are likely to be less affected by the income shock due to the pension reform. We also note 
that for this group the reform has no significant impact on the depression rate.14 
The estimation results presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4 are all consistent with strong 
ex ante effects from the pension reform on mental health. Is it likely that our findings are 
due to some artifact? Could it be that the reform caused some workers who are less prone 
to depression to leave the public sector and that this effect is stronger for the 1950 
cohort? This effect is not likely. Public sector pensions are relatively generous and, along 
with the pension reform in the public sector, all other sectors changed their pension plans 
because the preferential tax treatment of pension premiums was abolished for both public 
and private sector workers. Further, job mobility rates out of the public sector into the 
private sector are extremely low for older workers. When moving to another sector, it is 
likely that these workers will not only incur costs associated with a change in pension 
fund, but that they will entirely loose their rights to retire before age 65. The majority of 
                                                 
14 It would have been interesting to see whether the partner is also affected by the reform and examine 
whether the treatment effect differs with respect to this. However, we only know the age of the partner and 
whether the partner has an income. The latter variable is already included in the analyses. We therefore did 
not pursue this issue further.  
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pensions in The Netherlands impose not only an age criterion but also a minimum 
number of tenure years within a sector or sometimes even a firm (Euwals et al., 2006). 
 We drop individuals who worked continuously in the public sector only since 
1997. It is conceivable that those with mental health problems are more likely to have 
gaps in their employment history and therefore do not pass this selection criterion. 
However, this could affect our results only if this affects the treated cohort (that of 1950) 
differently than the 1949 cohort. There is no reason to expect this. Moreover, when this is 
the case, one would expect to see this reflected in other factors that are correlated with 
depression (such as marital status) or with gaps in employment (income for instance). As 
discussed in Section 3, we see no differences in the observed variables between the two 
groups (see Table 1). We run additional regressions in which we add this group to the 
sample (216 full-time workers) and include a dummy variable for this group in addition 
to whether workers of this group were born in 1950. Both coefficients are insignificant, 
indicating that the mental health status of this group does not differ from workers born in 
1949 and those who worked continuously since 1997 (the controls). 
Are there other factors that differ between the two groups, such as the level of 
education? The averages in Table 1 reveal no important differences in this respect. 
Furthermore, we are aware of no changes in the system that may have differentially 
affected the 1950 (1949) cohort as opposed to the 1949 (1950) cohort. 
 
 
5 Behavioral responses 
 
One important question is whether the reform has affected the savings behavior and/or 
the retirement behavior of those affected, as workers with retrenched pension rights may 
save more in order to maintain their previously planned retirement date. In a recent paper, 
Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) explore this issue with respect to the US. They used an 
internet survey in which they asked the respondents of the Health and Retirement Survey 
(HRS) what they would do if their Social Security benefits were cut by 30 percent. The 
authors found that on average individuals would then postpone retirement by 1.13 years. 
About two-thirds indicated that they would reduce their spending to compensate for the 
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drop in pension wealth. Our survey includes two savings questions and one question on 
expected retirement age that enable us to analyze such behavioral responses. 
 
Savings behavior 
The first savings question asks whether the respondent undertook additional savings 
arrangements for their pension in the past year. The second question addresses whether 
the respondent participates in the “Life course savings” program (see Section 2). In Table 
5, we report the results from analyses of the savings question. Columns 1 and 2 report 
results from the first question, columns 3 and 4 report results from the second question. 
The first two columns of Table 5 show a strong effect from the reform on additional 
pension savings if no controls are included. The coefficient is positive, indicating that 
those who are affected by the reform engaged in additional savings in the past year to 
compensate for the loss in pension wealth. However, the effect becomes insignificant 
when we include the full set of regressors. Columns 3 and 4 show strong effects from the 
pension reform on participation in the “Life course savings” program. The results of 
column 3 reflect what we see in Table 1: the reference group (1949) has a participation 
rate of around 6 percent, whereas the participation rate of the affected cohort is about 
nine percentage points higher. Adding controls reduces the magnitude of the reform 
effect, but the effect is nevertheless substantial and strongly significant.  Unfortunately, 
we cannot observe how much participants save yearly in the “Life course savings” 
program. Workers in the 1950 cohort would have to save for seven years about 14% of 
their annual yearly earnings to finance early retirement at the age of 62. It is likely that 
only a small fraction of participants is able and willing to save such a high share of their 
earnings each year prior to retirement. 
 
Expected retirement age 
Figures 2a and 2b give a histogram of expected retirement ages (At what age do you 
expect to retire now?), and figures 3a and 3b of expectations 5 years ago (At what age did 
you expect to retire 5 years ago?). From Figures 3a and 3b, one may conclude that the 
distribution of expected retirement ages five years ago was virtually identical for the 1949 
and 1950 cohorts. However, this is very different for Figures 2a (affected by the reform) 
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and 2b (not affected by the reform). Compared to the 1949 cohort, a much larger share of 
those treated expects to retire at age 65. On the other hand, quite surprisingly, rather 
equal fractions of both the treated and the control groups expect to retire at age 57 or 58. 
The treated workers may harbor no such expectation, because in the new system they 
cannot receive pension benefits prior to age 60 (see Section 2). It could be that these 
workers do not fully understand all details of the new system. However, Figure 1 shows 
clearly that the cohort that is affected by the reform understands the implications for their 
replacement rate if they wish to retire at age 62. Alternatively, it could be that these are 
workers who decide to stop working in the public sector or that they are more likely to 
leave the labor force via alternative exit routes like disability insurance. The data allow us 
to check the latter proposition to some extent. We examine prevalence rates for other 
health variables (self-assessed health, the response to the limitations question, the number 
of visits to the doctor and whether respondents were sick more than 14 days in the past 
year) for this group and the other respondents born in 1950 and find no difference with 
respect to these health variables. Also, the depression rates for this group are similar to 
the rates of others born in 1950. 
In Table 6, we report the results of further analysis on the expected retirement age. 
The table shows that the reform has a significant effect on the expected age of retirement, 
but this effect is significant only at the 10% level when the full set of controls is added to 
the specification. The coefficient of 0.274 amounts to about 4 months’ postponement of 
retirement. This is lower than the effect found by Delavande and Rohwedder (2008), but 
in their hypothetical situation they asked respondents to indicate what they would do 
when the Social Security benefit is reduced by 30%. Furthermore, those affected by the 
reform are more likely to participate in the “Life course savings” program (see Table 5), 
which may partially compensate for the loss in pension wealth. We also perform a 
regression on the probability of late retirement (later than age 63). This regression 
indicates that the probability of late retirement is increased by 16 percentage points and 
that this effect is significant at the 1% level. 
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6 Why is the affected cohort so depressed? 
 
An important question is why the reform has such a strong impact on mental health? One 
possibility is that (the prospect of) longer working in itself causes decreased mental 
health. We explore this by examining the effect of expectations about the retirement age 
on depression. For this, we use an Instrumental Variable (IV) approach in which we 
instrument expected retirement age with the reform dummy.15 The coefficient of the 
expected retirement age is equal to 0.1005 and is not significant at the standard levels (s.e. 
= 0.077). However, the F-test of the first-stage regression suggests a weak instruments 
problem (the F-statistic equals 4.52, which is well below the value of 10 suggested by 
Staiger & Stock, 1997). We also examine the effect of expected late retirement (later than 
age 63) on mental health. The IV regression reveals a positive and strongly significant 
coefficient (0.162, s.e. 0.0078). The F-test of this first stage regression equals 18.61 
(tables not reported, but available upon request). This finding is in line with Charles 
(2005), who finds that later retirement has adverse effects on mental health. 
Finding a negative effect from late expected retirement on mental health, however, 
does not rule out that other mechanisms may be at work that cause the relatively high 
depression rate of the 1950 cohort. We therefore regress the depression indicator on the 
savings and expected retirement age variables. The regressions also include a full set of 
other controls. The idea is that if, for instance, late expected retirement is the prime factor 
driving the higher depression rates among the 1950 cohort, then one would expect to see 
a large effect from this variable and little or no effects from the reform indicator 
(treatment dummy). The results of these analyses (reported in Table 7) show that the 
reform indicator remains large and strongly significant after inclusion of savings 
variables and expectations variables. One can conclude from this that apparently factors 
other than (forced) savings and later retirement are responsible for the relatively high 
depression rate among those affected by the reform. 
Another potential factor is the way in which the pension system reform was set up.  
The 2006 reform of the pension system represented a major change that added to previous 
                                                 
15 It is likely that retirement age expectations are endogenously related to the depression rate. Either 
because there are feedback effects from depression on retirement expectations, or because there are 
unobservables that correlate both to depression and individual expectations.  
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reforms in the retirement system. In particular, the 1949 cohort was the last cohort that was 
allowed to retire at relatively young ages against relatively generous replacement rates.  
The 1950 cohort is the first cohort that must work longer against substantially lower 
replacement rates. Further, this group of workers faces this new situation with relatively 
short notice—too short to completely offset the change in the system with additional 
savings. The change in the pension system was not entirely unexpected, but the particular 
type of discontinuous assignment rule and the strong differential treatment of workers born 
around January 1, 1950 came as a surprise when announced in July 2005. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that it was perceived to be unfair. For more on this issue, see Montizaan 
et al. (2009), who use the same data as this paper to examine the relation between job 
motivation and reciprocity.16 Their main finding is that job motivation declines among 
negatively reciprocal individuals who face an unexpected drop in pension rights, while no 
effect is found among non-reciprocal employees. We therefore also estimate separate 
models for negatively reciprocal individuals and non-negatively reciprocal individuals. 
The measure of negative reciprocity is derived from the responses to three questions.17 A 
worker is defined to be negatively reciprocal if his score falls above the median score. 
We find that negatively reciprocal individuals have a much stronger response to the 
reform than non-negatively reciprocal workers. The coefficients are 0.044 (s.e. of 0.017) 
and 0.013 (s.e. of 0.014) for negatively reciprocal and non-negatively reciprocal 
individuals, respectively. This suggests that indeed feelings of unfair treatment may drive 
much of the strong effects from the reform on mental health. 
Our findings also relate to the literature on individual well being and happiness. 
This literature finds that individual well being may be affected by income, but also by the 
difference between one’s own income and the income of a reference group (see for an 
overview, Clark et al., 2008). Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) finds that the income of the 
reference group is about as important as own income for individual happiness. Calvo, 
Haverstick and Sass (2007) examine the factors that affect individual happiness in the 
transition to retirement. Their results suggest that what really matters is whether people 
                                                 
16 Negative reciprocity is an in-kind response to hostile acts which indicates retaliatory tendencies.   
17 Respondents had to respond to how much (ranging form 1 = not at all to 5 = fits me completely) they 
identified themselves with each of the following statements: 1) If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take up 
revenge no matter what the costs; 2) If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I will do the same to him 
or her; 3) If somebody insults me, I will give an insult back.  
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perceive the transition from work to retirement as chosen or forced.  These authors suggest 
that it is the sense of control over their own retirements that influences the happiness of 
older workers. It appears clear that control over one’s own retirement is a problem for 
Dutch workers born in 1950.  For cohorts born in later years, this is presumably less of a 
problem as the longer period before retirement allows them to better compensate for their 
loss of pension wealth. Unfortunately we cannot test this with our data. 
 
 
7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The reform that affected the pension wealth of the younger (1950) cohort had a strong 
impact on their mental health. Our analysis reveals that those who by chance are exposed 
to a pension reform that confronts them with substantially lower pension wealth have 
higher depression rates. This effect persists over time and grows stronger the closer one is 
born to the threshold date. Furthermore, we find differing effects for different types of 
workers. For instance, the effects are stronger for unmarried workers and negligible for 
workers whose partner has a pension or an income. Finally, we find that those affected by 
the reform also respond by working an additional four months and that they are more 
likely to participate in a savings program that is likely to only partially compensate for 
the loss in pension wealth. Our data do not allow us to give a definitive answer to the 
questions of why the depression rate of the affected group is so much higher and why this 
effect persists over time. We find that later expected retirement is important for mental 
health, but other factors are also at work. The discontinuous assignment rule and the 
strong differential treatment of workers born around January 1, 1950 is perceived to be 
unfair, especially because it was announced only a few years before the retirement date of 
the affected workers. Too little time remained to allow these workers to fully offset the 
loss in pension wealth. Workers were suddenly forced into a new situation with little 
control over their retirement decision; this may have affected their mental health. 
  Our findings have great relevance for public policy. Currently, most countries in 
the developed world are revising their pension systems to cope with population aging. 
The reforms are geared toward extending working life and to a smaller role for defined 
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benefit pensions. Furthermore, a substantial part of the pension wealth of workers has 
recently evaporated due to the current financial crises. Changes in worker pension claims, 
due either to financial crises or to government pension policy changes, will have severe 
consequences for most workers nearing retirement. Workers either must accept a 
substantial drop in pension wealth, increase pension contributions and/or work 
substantially longer than they expected before the current crisis. The results of this study 
show that this sudden irreversible deterioration of future prospects can have serious 
consequences for the mental health of workers nearing retirement, especially when the 
period before the planned retirement is too short to compensate for losses in pension 
wealth. In the longer run these mental health effects may translate into somatic diseases. 
This will not only affect individual well being, but it will also engender costs associated 
with depression and worse physical health, such as direct health care costs and indirect 
costs due to loss of productivity, flawed decision making, and workplace accidents.  
Governments should take these effects and costs into account when redesigning pension 
policies. 
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Table 1 Means of variables for all respondents and for respondents affected and not affected by the policy change 
  All Affected by policy 
change 
Not affected by policy 
change 
T-stat 
  Mean St. Dev Mean Mean  
Health       
Depressed  0,043 0,202 0,050 0,035 2.63 
CESD8 score  0,589 1,174 0,621 0,554 2.03 
Number of doctor visits in past year  2,128 2,533 2,126 2,130 0.05 
Sick for > 14 days in past year  0,167 0,373 0,163 0,171 0.83 
Health limits work (yes=1)  0,182 0,386 0,185 0,178 0.28 
Retirement expectations       
Expectations about replacement rate  69,378 11,765 66,972 72,049 16.00 
Expected retirement age  62,000 2,580 62,105 61,884 3.12 
Expected retirement age 5 years ago  61,455 2,240 61,417 61,497 1.24 
Job Characteristics       
Fraction of non-routine tasks (opposite to routine 
tasks) 
 0,294 0,210 0,297 0,291 0.99 
Physically demanding work  0,131 0,337 0,131 0,131 0.05 
Mentally demanding work  0,666 0,472 0,676 0,655 1.63 
Log yearly wage income  10,832 0,283 10,828 10,836 0.99 
Other personal characteristics       
Lower secondary education  0,110 0,313 0,117 0,103 1.62 
Higher secondary education  0,038 0,192 0,039 0,038 0.17 
Vocational education  0,135 0,341 0,132 0,138 0.64 
Higher education   0,617 0,486 0,612 0,622 0.75 
Married  0,916 0,278 0,909 0,923 1.85 
Sectors       
Government    0,400 0,490 0,416 0,382 2.61 
Education sector  0,374 0,484 0,359 0,391 2.43 
Energy, public transportation   0,136 0,342 0,137 0,134 0.33 
Other (Judicial sector, utilities)   0,030 0,170 0,030 0,028 0.64 
Wealth and Income sources after retirement       
Number of years contributed to pension fund 31,143 6,340 30,468 31,894 8.24 
Pension rights at other pension funds  0,131 0,337 0,132 0,130 0.16 
Partner has pension or income  0,473 0,499 0,471 0,475 0.28 
Net housing wealth  0,562 0,496 0,567 0,557 0.73 
Inheritance  0,138 0,344 0,139 0,136 0.61 
Annuity Insurance  0,517 0,500 0,518 0,516 0.12 
Life insurance  0,264 0,441 0,263 0,266 0.23 
Savings account > 15,000 Euros  0,610 0,488 0,615 0,604 0.71 
Investment  0,350 0,477 0,352 0,348 0.28 
Life course savings program  0,115 0,319 0,159 0,06  9.31 
Other assets or pension savings 0,098 0,298 0,104 0,092  1.28 
Extra savings for pensions in previous years  0,249 0,433 0,270 0,226 3.70 
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Table 2 The effect of the policy change on mental health (Depression indicator; CESD8 ≥ 4) 
VARIABLES I II III IV 
Treated (affected by the policy) 0.015*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.028** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Age (in days divided by 100)  0.003 0.003 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married  -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.035*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Lower secondary education   0.003 0.005 0.001 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Higher secondary education  -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Higher education   0.005 0.011 0.008 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Government    -0.002 -0.002 -0.012 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
Education sector  0.002 0.003 -0.017 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Energy, public transportation   -0.006 -0.009 -0.025 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Physically demanding work    -0.002 
    (0.009) 
Mentally demanding work    0.024*** 
    (0.006) 
Fraction of non-routine tasks    -0.026* 
    (0.014) 
Log yearly wage income (divided by 100)  -3.743*** -3.712*** -1.484 
  (1.264) (1.270) (1.264) 
# of years contributed to the pension fund (/100)  0.073 0.094* 0.094** 
  (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) 
Pension rights at other pension funds   0.016* 0.011 
   (0.010) (0.009) 
Partner has pension or income   -0.022*** -0.018*** 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Net housing wealth   0.003 0.009 
   (0.007) (0.007) 
Inheritance   -0.016* -0.012 
   (0.009) (0.008) 
Missing info on other pension   0.010 0.002 
   (0.014) (0.013) 
Partner info missing   -0.024 -0.015 
   (0.015) (0.014) 
Net housing wealth missing   0.017 0.020 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Info on inheritance missing   -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.012) (0.011) 
Self-reported general health    0.034*** 
    (0.005) 
Self-reported work limitations    0.066*** 
    (0.009) 
Number of doctor visits in past year    0.007*** 
    (0.001) 
Sick for > 14 days in past year    0.028*** 
    (0.009) 
Observations 5,195 4,854 4,854 4,765 
R-squared 0.001 0.009 0.012 0.101 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3 The effect of the policy change on a depression score: results for respondents born more or 
less near to 1-1-1950 
 
VARIABLES 
Born within 3 
months of 1-1-1950
Born within 6 
months of 1-1-1950
Born within 10 
months of 1-1-1950 
Born within 12 
months of 1-1-1950
Treated (affected by the policy) 0.024** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations 1,168 2,407 3,557 4,765 
R-squared 0.126 0.116 0.100 0.101 
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
The regressions include the same set of regressors as in specification IV of Table 2 (a set of health variables, individual and job characteristics and selected wealth 
variables). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The regressions include the same set of regressors as in specification IV of Table 2 (a set of health variables, individual and job characteristics and selected wealth 
variables). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 The effect of the policy change on depression: Heterogeneous effects 
 Married Below Average income Government sector Partner has pension or 
income 
Number of years contributed 
to pension fund (≥ 32) 
VARIABLES Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Treated (affected by policy 
change) 
0.023** 0.099* 0.021 0.029** 0.053*** 0.010 0.008 0.037** 0.032** 0.022 
 (0.011) (0.055) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
Observations 4,376 389 1,972 3,009 2,013 2,752 2,265 2,150 2,544 2,221 
R-squared 0.091 0.214 0.131 0.080 0.148 0.079 0.092 0.111 0.105 0.106 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 5 Do people supplement their retirement income with extra pension savings? 
 Extra pension savings Life course savings 
VARIABLES I II III IV 
Treated (affected by the policy) 0.044*** 0.011 0.091*** 0.052*** 
 (0.012) (0.024) (0.008) (0.019) 
Age (in days divided by 100)  -0.006  -0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.005) 
Married  0.027  -0.008 
  (0.023)  (0.018) 
Lower secondary education  -0.031  -0.012 
  (0.024)  (0.020) 
Higher secondary education  0.025  -0.020 
  (0.034)  (0.027) 
Higher education   0.035*  0.008 
  (0.021)  (0.017) 
Government    -0.015  -0.019 
  (0.036)  (0.029) 
Education sector  0.014  -0.011 
  (0.037)  (0.029) 
Energy, public transportation   -0.013  0.028 
  (0.039)  (0.033) 
Physically demanding work  0.034*  0.016 
  (0.021)  (0.017) 
Mentally demanding work  0.026*  0.006 
  (0.014)  (0.011) 
Fraction of non-routine tasks    0.020  0.014 
  (0.030)  (0.024) 
Log yearly wage income (divided by 100)  6.410**  6.687*** 
  (2.795)  (2.274) 
Number of years contributed to the pension fund (divided by 100)  -0.563***  -0.098 
  (0.103)  (0.085) 
Pension rights at other pension funds  0.035*  0.020 
  (0.020)  (0.016) 
Partner has pension or income  -0.008  0.011 
  (0.015)  (0.010) 
Net housing wealth  0.020  0.020* 
  (0.015)  (0.011) 
Inheritance  0.045**  0.050*** 
  (0.019)  (0.013) 
Missing info on other pension  0.090***  0.361*** 
  (0.029)  (0.040) 
Partner info missing  -0.040  -0.005 
  (0.031)  (0.050) 
Net housing wealth missing  0.001  0.233*** 
  (0.030)  (0.046) 
Info on inheritance missing  0.070***  0.408*** 
  (0.025)  (0.035) 
Self-reported general health  -0.003  0.003 
  (0.010)  (0.008) 
Self-reported work limitations  -0.002  0.025 
  (0.020)  (0.016) 
Number of doctor visits in past year  0.002  -0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Sick for > 14 days in past year  0.018  -0.005 
  (0.019)  (0.015) 
Constant  0.226*** -0.189 0.064*** -0.467 
 (0.009) (0.373) (0.006) (0.302) 
Observations 5,360 4,870 5,488 3,489 
R-squared 0.003 0.035 0.021 0.197 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses     
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Table 6 Do people change their retirement expectations? 
 Expected retirement age 
 
Late retirement  (expected 
retirement age > 63) 
Expected retirement age 5 
years ago 
VARIABLES I II III IV V VI 
Treated (affected by the policy) 0.221*** 0.274* 0.030*** 0.156*** -0.080 -0.139 
 (0.071) (0.147) (0.004) (0.026) (0.064) (0.130) 
Age (in days divided by 100)  0.040  0.002  0.004 
  (0.035)  (0.006)  (0.031) 
Married  -0.220  -0.032  -0.445*** 
  (0.141)  (0.024)  (0.124) 
Lower secondary education  -0.124  -0.050**  -0.259** 
  (0.146)  (0.025)  (0.128) 
Higher secondary education  0.081  -0.013  0.106 
  (0.207)  (0.036)  (0.179) 
Higher education   0.030  -0.026  0.236** 
  (0.126)  (0.022)  (0.114) 
Government    -0.344  -0.040  -0.483** 
  (0.215)  (0.038)  (0.193) 
Education sector  -0.362  -0.022  -0.052 
  (0.221)  (0.039)  (0.198) 
Energy, public transportation   -0.678***  -0.093**  -0.729*** 
  (0.234)  (0.041)  (0.222) 
Physically demanding work  0.025  -0.008  -0.052 
  (0.124)  (0.022)  (0.113) 
Mentally demanding work  -0.134  -0.049***  -0.278*** 
  (0.082)  (0.014)  (0.073) 
Fraction of non-routine tasks   0.248  0.112***  0.581*** 
  (0.184)  (0.032)  (0.163) 
Log yearly wage income (divided by 100)  -25.755  -1.589  41.410*** 
  (16.888)  (2.929)  (15.501) 
# of years contributed to the pension fund (/ 100)  -3.888***  -0.859***  -6.821*** 
  (0.634)  (0.108)  (0.559) 
Pension rights at other pension funds  -0.168  -0.001  0.015 
  (0.124)  (0.021)  (0.105) 
Partner has pension or income  0.119  -0.005  0.092 
  (0.089)  (0.015)  (0.075) 
Net housing wealth  -0.159*  -0.031*  -0.083 
  (0.093)  (0.016)  (0.078) 
Inheritance  0.023  0.013  0.099 
  (0.113)  (0.020)  (0.095) 
Missing info on other pension  -0.111  -0.048  -0.091 
  (0.175)  (0.030)  (0.148) 
Partner info missing  0.035  -0.022  0.152 
  (0.189)  (0.033)  (0.166) 
Net housing wealth missing  0.018  0.004  -0.048 
  (0.181)  (0.031)  (0.158) 
Info on inheritance missing  -0.017  0.014  -0.148 
  (0.149)  (0.026)  (0.126) 
Self-reported general health  0.013  -0.024**  -0.188*** 
  (0.064)  (0.011)  (0.056) 
Self-reported work limitations  -0.309**  -0.064***  -0.297*** 
  (0.121)  (0.021)  (0.107) 
Number of doctor visits in past year  -0.002  0.002  0.003 
  (0.017)  (0.003)  (0.015) 
Sick for > 14 days in past year  -0.035  0.004  0.004 
  (0.115)  (0.020)  (0.103) 
Constant 61.884*** 65.108*** 0.846*** 0.778** 61.497*** 60.052*** 
 (0.051) (2.253) (0.003) (0.390) (0.047) (2.049) 
Observations 5319 4752 27299 4877 4853 4323 
R-squared 0.002 0.019 0.002 0.063 0.000 0.092 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7 The importance of the reform, retirement expectations and savings behavior   
VARIABLES I II 
Treated (affected by the policy) 0.031** 0.031** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Expected retirement age -0.002  
 (0.001)  
Expected late retirement  -0.005 
  (0.007) 
Extra pension savings 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
Life course savings 0.015 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.108 -0.035 
 (0.221) (0.205) 
Observations 3,336 3,336 
R-squared 0.110 0.111 
 *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses   
The regressions include the same set of regressors as in specification IV of Table 2 (a set of health variables, 
individual and job characteristics and selected wealth variables). 
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Figure 1: Validity of the natural experiment: Does the population understand the reform? 
 
 
 
 
This figure presents the mean expected pension benefit at age 62 in percentage of present wage income for each 
birth month. The information is based on the following survey question: “Suppose you would retire at the age of 62. 
How large would your pension benefit be (in percentage of your net wage income)?" Our sample consists of two 
birth years where employees born in 1949 (month 1–12) are entitled to the old pension rules and employees born in 
1950 (month 13–24) are subject to the new pension rules. The vertical line in the figure marks the threshold 
dividing the control and treatment groups. 
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Figure 2a: Expected retirement age (“At what age do you expect to stop working completely”): 
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Figure 2b: Expected retirement age (“At what age do you expect to stop working completely”): 
Control group 
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Figure 3a: Expected retirement age five years ago: Treatment group 
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Figure 3b: Expected retirement age five years ago: Control group 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 The effect of the policy change on mental health (Poisson regressions on 
CESD8 score) 
VARIABLES I1 II 
Treated (affected by the policy) 0.066*** 0.093*** 
 (0.021) (0.034) 
Age (in days divided by 100)  0.012 
  (0.008) 
Married  -0.182*** 
  (0.036) 
Lower secondary education  0.017 
  (0.034) 
Higher secondary education  0.016 
  (0.051) 
Higher education   0.040 
  (0.029) 
Government    -0.013 
  (0.055) 
Education sector  -0.007 
  (0.056) 
Energy, public transportation   -0.005 
  (0.059) 
Physically demanding work  0.020 
  (0.025) 
Mentally demanding work  0.206*** 
  (0.018) 
Fraction of non-routine tasks    -0.099** 
  (0.044) 
Log yearly wage income (divided by 100)  -15.650*** 
  (4.102) 
Number of years contributed to the pension fund (divided by 100)  0.169 
  (0.139) 
Pension rights at other pension funds  0.015 
  (0.029) 
Partner has pension or income  -0.092*** 
  (0.020) 
Excess housing wealth  -0.009 
  (0.021) 
Inheritance  -0.042 
  (0.026) 
Missing info on other pension  0.096** 
  (0.046) 
Partner info missing  -0.123*** 
  (0.035) 
Excess housing wealth missing  0.000 
  (0.042) 
Info on inheritance missing  -0.001 
  (0.036) 
Self-reported general health  0.214*** 
  (0.013) 
Self-reported work limitations  0.285*** 
  (0.033) 
Number of doctor visits in past year  0.013*** 
  (0.003) 
Sick for > 14 days in past year  0.142*** 
  (0.026) 
Observations 5,195 4,765 
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 1 The table shows marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses.   
 
